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2ABSTRACT
There is now substantial empirical evidence, based essentially on
the experience of developed countries, that there is underinvestment in
industrial R&D consequent to the gradual withdrawal of the state. It is
generally observed that government can solve this problem of
underinvestment in two ways: by increasing the profits of innovators, or
by undertaking R&D in areas where the private sector underinvests. An
examination of the nature of government intervention in developed
countries show that it is increasingly moving towards the latter variety.
However, contrary to normal impression, the extent of government
intervention in industrial R&D in India is of the former variety. The
state has been using tax incentives as the major instrument for stimulating
R&D by production enterprises. Direct grants, which has become the
dominant instrument of intervention in the west,  is considered to be
better as it can be targeted towards specific projects. In fact the efficacy
of tax incentives to encourage R&D requires further scrutiny. The state
in India also have to intervene for making available technically trained
manpower to engage in industrial R&D radically redesigning the higher
education system, by improving the incentive system for those working
in the R&D system etc. The paper thus underscores the fact that there is
enough space for the Indian state to increase its interventionist role in
industrial research contrary to the arguments for its gradual withdrawal.
JEL Classification: O32, O38
Key Words:   appropriability, government intervention, industrial R&D
system, technology policy.
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Introduction
As part of the general theme of reducing the role of government
from various activities, though not stated very explicitly, a view is that
government should intervene less in the area of technology generation:
the focus of attention should be on in-house R&D centres attached to
business enterprises. But it is a rather well established proposition in
economic theory, and backed by a number of case studies, that firms are
unable to capture the full benefits of their investments in R&D. Two
reasons are adduced. First, competitors can learn something from the
results and appropriate part of the reward. Second, in highly competitive
markets for technology-intensive products, the rewards to innovation
are very short-lived since they are rapidly transferred to consumers in
the form of reduced prices. In the absence of proper compensating
mechanisms industrial firms therefore tend to underinvest in R&D. There
is already evidence for it from the OECD countries in the sense that the
industrial R&D expenditures has been flagging or showing negative rates
of growth1 . This has once again brought into focus the positive role of
government in promoting industrial R&D and innovation.
4India has been undergoing a phase of economic liberalisation since
1991 the basic  rationale of which has been to reduce the role of
government from various spheres of  economic activity.  It is in this
context that we see the deregulation of the industrial and the external
sectors, privatisation of public sector enterprises etc., Under the prevailing
mood of rolling back the state, it is felt, though not stated explicitly, that
the government should intervene less in the area of technology generation
and its subsequent development. This has manifested itself in the form
of the country not having an explicit policy statement on technology2  in
keeping with the changes in the external environment. A second
manifestation is the policy that increasingly the government research
institutes will have to generate a larger proportion of its budget from
external sources other than the government.
The basic theme analysed in this paper is to understand the precise
role to be played by  government  in promoting technology generation.
The focus is not on government itself conducting the R&D but rather on
the specific instruments or modes through which it can provide an
enabling environment for the private sector to do research.   In keeping
with this objective, I first examine the rationale for state intervention in
industrial R&D and illustrates this with the current debates on the theme
in developed countries as in most developed countries there is now a
move towards having a national technology or a public innovation policy.
In the light of this examination,  the lessons that India can draw from the
former experience are mapped out. The paper thus concludes with making
some informed comments towards framing a  policy for the local
development of technology in the Indian industrial establishment.
2 The last Technology Policy Statement was announced in 1983.
5The Rationale for and Approaches to Government Intervention in
R&D
An important feature of the innovation systems in the West is the
declining rates of growth in Industrial R&D expenditures. See Figure 1.
In the US the rate of growth of the  industrial R&D expenditures started
declining since the mid 1980s while in the case of the EU, the decline
set in from about 1987 or so.
Figure 1
Along with this declining rate of growth , one also observes the
gradual withdrawal of the state from financing of industrial R&D. See
Table 1.
6Source: National Science Foundation (1991), p.23
The US case is particularly interesting3 . Growth in total US R&D
expenditures4  has been slow since the mid-1980s.  From 1980 to 1985,
R&D spending increased on average by 6.6 percent per year in real
terms.  From 1985 to 1996, by preliminary calculations, it slowed to 1.4
percent, in comparison to a 2.6 annual real growth in GDP.  The
NSF(1996a) attributes this slow down to a slackening in both Federal
and non-federal support for R&D, as a proportion of GDP,   though
Federal support has been declining at a faster rate than non-federal
support. Consequently, the 4-percent rise in real R&D during 1995 was
much more the exception than the rule.  From 1985 to 1996, the proportion
of GDP spent on R&D has fallen consistently, from 2.8 percent to 2.5
percent (based on current projections). The Japanese case is very
interesting. Government in the country has only a limited role in financing
industrial R&D (Table 1) almost the entire expenditure is expended by
Table 1: Extent of Government Intervention in the Financing of
Industrial R&D in the US, Japan and the UK (per cent)
 Year USA Japan UK
State    Industry   State   Industry State    Industry
1970 43 57 1 99 32 63
1980 32 68 2 98 30 61
1988 33 67 2 98 33 67
3 This data contained in this section is based on  NSF (1996).
4 In the USA, industrial R&D accounts for over 52 per cent of the overall R&D
expenditute. See NSF (1993), p. 107.
7the private sector itself 5 . According to the estimates by OECD (1996a)
the average annual rate of growth of R&D expenditures in the business
enterprise sector declined to 7.4 per cent during the period 1985-1989
from 11.2 percent during 1981-85. Thus it is found that the withdrawal
of the state from industrial R&D is accompanied by a progressive decline
in its growth rate.
Even in the advanced capitalist economies there is an explicit
recognition of the need for government intervention to correct for possible
underinvestment by the private sector. The most commonly cited
argument favouring government intervention is due to the problem of
appropriability. A formal statement of this argument is to be found in
Arrow (1962). This problem arises because there are certain kinds of
industrial research where the new findings are difficult to be kept as
secrets either because know-how leaks easily and patent protection is
ineffective6 . The knowledge that is acquired in the absence of a market
transaction is commonly referred to as an R&D spillover. The studies by
Reinganum (1981) and Spence (1984) formally showed that, as R&D
spillovers in a given industry increase, the incentive to undertake R&D
diminishes. The empirical evidence on the R&D spillovers is scant, and
5 This issue of apparently low government intervention in industrial R&D requires
some explanation. Government has ofcourse intervened by placing restrictions
on technology imports and by poroviding financial incentives, tax credits, and
low-interest loans, to encourage technological accumulastion. See Odagiri and
Goto (1996).. Another explanation is interms of the almighty role assigned to
MITI. See Fransman (1995), pp. 95-119. However as argued below (on pp.8-9),
the government in Japan is showing very clear signs of wanting to increase its
role in promoting industrial R&D.
6 The rationale for patenting is simple: in effect it grants patent-holders a monopoly
and allows them to reap higher profits than they would in a competitive market.
The prospect of such monopoly profits is what encourages firms to innovate in
the first place. But empirical research into the effectiveness of patents across the
US and Western Europe shows that it is the least effective means of appropriability.
See  Mansfield (1986),  and Habib (1994).
8only a few studies have estimated their effects with any rigour7 . The
most cited study is by Mansfield and others (1977). They calculated the
divergence between social and private returns for seventeen innovations
and found that the median social return was twice as large as the private
return. Using US data Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) also reached similar
conclusions when they found that the excess of social return over private
return varied from as low as 9 per cent for machinery to a high of 76 per
cent in petroleum product industries. Estimates on returns to R&D for
developing countries are practically non-existent. The study by Basant
and Fikkert (1993) is an important exception. Their estimates,  based a
sample of firms in the Indian manufacturing sector, range from 19 to 80
per cent.
The argument for government intervention in civil industrial R&D
has manifested itself in the form of what is increasingly termed as public
innovation policies. There is now an active debate both in the US and in
the UK calling for policies for government intervention in technology
generation. In the UK the debate is led by Stoneman (1993) who argues
for some of government intervention to stimulate civil industrial R&D.
Though much of the industrial R&D in the west is performed and
financed by the private sector, there are various instruments or modes
through which governments have intervened to prevent possible
underinvestment. I first provide a summary of these various measures
and then go on to discuss them in some depth. The purpose of the survey
is to draw some lessons, on the basis of this, for an appropriate technology
policy for India.  See Table 2.
7 For a brief review of the literature on returns to R&D, see Evenson and Westphal
(1994), pp. 55-57.
9Table 2: Alternate Policies and Instruments for Government
Intervention in Civil Industrial R&D
Types of Measures Financial Measures Non-financial Measures
Public provision of  * Subsidising exchange *  Bridging institutions for
goods and services of R&D personnel exchaning aand sharing
 between public and knowledge.
* Dffusion Policies
* Education and training;
* University and
government  R&D;
* Management of the
public sector.
Modification of *  Tax incentives for R&D *  Public procurement
market incentives  particularly in defence
* Direct funding through
grants, soft loans, loan * The IPR regime
guarantees for R & D
projects;
* Competition policy for
R & D projects;
* Joint or co-operative
R&D projects between
government and the
private sector. * Foreign trade and
investment policy.
Support of the * Creation or improve-
improvement of ment of specialised * Risk sharing
market mechanism financial market
mechanisms (e.g.
venture capital)
Source: Stoneman (1993) Guinet and Kamata (1996).
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It will now be instructive to find out which of these innovation
policy tools are the most common. For discussing this I rely on a survey
of innovation policy tools contained in Folster (1988) and reported again
Folster (1991). I restrict the presentation of Folster’s results, to three
developed countries, namely the US, U.K., and Japan. See Table 3.
The comparison shows a clear difference  between Japan and the
other two countries.  Subsidies and tax  incentives are  an  important
component  of  the  innovation  policy  in  bo th the US and in the U.K.
On the contrary, the extent of government intervention in Japan is the
Table 3: Analysis of Policy Recommendations by Type of  Tool, in
Per cent of Country Total
Policy Measures US U.K. Japan
1. Subsidies and tax
credits to firms 23 25 7
2. Education 15 19 7
3. University and
government R&D 18 12 38
4. Management of the
public sector 19 31 33
5. Laws and regulations 16 3 4
6. Foreign trade policy 9 10 9
Note: These percentages are arrived at by counting the number of policy
recommendations in a number of public innovation policy statements
since 1987.
Source: Folster (1991), p. 23.
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least8 . In most of the developed world the preoccupation with laws and
regulations as innovation policy tools seems to be diminishing in favour
of subsidies and trade policy9 . Following Folster (1991), the subsidy
instruments can be divided into two broad categories: general and
selective while selective subsidies are further subdivided into self-
financing and non self-financing. See Chart 1.
8 This scenario, I believe is slowly changing. For instance, in 1992, Japan’s basic
policy for Science and Technology called for a doubling of the government’s
R&D budget as soon as possible. If such an expansion in the budget is achieved,
annual government R&D investment would be around $ 18 billion in the year
2000, approximately double the 1992 budget in constant yen. See NSF (1997) for
more details.  Further,   the Japanese government has enacted a law called Japan’s
Basic Law for Science and Technology (Law No. 130) which came into force on
November 15, 1995 to provide more state support to the conduct and organisation
of especially industrial R&D. The Article 17 of the Law states that, “in
consideration of the importance of the role played by the private sector in S&T
activities in Japan, the nation should implement necessary policy measures to
promote private sector R&D by encouraging initiatives in the private sector”.
However whether the necessary policy measures include further financial subsidies
needs to be researched into. In compliance with the Law’s requirement that  the
government  establish a “Basic Plan for Science and Technology,” the Prime
Minister tasked the Council for Science and Technology on December 29, 1995
to develop a proposal for a Basic Plan.
9 For an excellent survey of technology policy in developed countries, see Mowery
(1994), pp. 7-55.
 Subsidy Instrument
General Subsidies Selective Subsidies
1. Tax deduction for R &D purposes;
2. Tax deduction for a rise in R & D expenses
3. Personnel grant towards costs of R &D personnal
Non Self- fiancing Self-financing Subsidies
1. Project grants; 1. Fee-based loan guarantees,
2.Project laons at subsidised interest rates; 2. Royalty grants
3. Conditional loans and loan guarantess 3. Stock option gants;
4. Convertible loans;
5. Equity invetments
Chart 1.
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The  chart can be simplified  into three main categories of support
(OECD, 1996):
* Direct financing measures to support R&D
activities of manufacturing enterprises: This support
is given through a variety of investments like direct
grants, tax concessions, loans and loan guarantees,
equity capital etc.;
* Civilian and defence-related R&D contracts
awarded to manufacturing enterprises: In most of
the countries  much of the contracts are defence related.
Civilian R&D contracts focus on energy and
information technology. The rules governing the
appropriation of intellectual property rights that result
from such contractual research vary widely. In some
countries, these rights are attributed to the public
contractor while in others to the contracting firm.
Contracting firms may derive a sizeable competitive
advantage from the appropriation of intellectual
property rights; and
* Support to intermediary R&D institutions serving
the enterprise sector: The services covered by these
institutions cover a broad range of technological fields
and include testing, secondment of R&D staff to
manufacturing enterprises, training, consulting, and
R&D co-operation with firms. Although these
institutions are reported to price their services at market
rates to cover costs, contributions from government
appear to play a regular and important role in balancing
their budgets.
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A recent survey by the OECD (1996b) has for the first time
quantified in an exhaustive manner the entire gamut of public support to
manufacturing R&D by the major public players in national R&D systems
of the OECD countries. Data are reported according to the above-
mentioned three categories. See Figure 2 for the type-wise trends in the
public support.
R&D contracts signify the most important component but however
it has been nearly stagnating. The direct support to R&D is the next
important segment and it has been growing at a rate of nearly 9 per cent
per annum: the decline in 1993 is perhaps due to reporting gaps10 . All
Figure 2
10 See OECD (1996b), p. 27.
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the three put together account for as much as 15 per cent (approximately)
of the total industrial R&D budget of the region. Since direct support to
R&D is the one that is relevant  for our discussion I now present the
details on it. See Table 4.
Among the direct support mechanisms, grant appear to be the most
dominant form. Moreover it has also increased its share rather
significantly. Tax concessions, while the second most important, has
eroded its share by nearly one-half. This disenchantment as if it were
with tax concessions warrants a closer look. This is because increasingly
Table 4 : Direct Support to R&D and Technological Innovation
Programmes in the Developed Countries-Financing
Instrument-wise (Current Million $)
Financing
Instrument 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Grant 2709.2(42.5)     3590.0(45.6)    4144.4(45.5)    5334.5(53.5) 5079.8(58.5)
Tax
Concessions 2251.8(35.4) 2468.2(31.4) 2825.4(31.0) 1973.0(19.8) 1716.9(19.8)
Loan 79.4(1.2) 99.5(1.3) 152.5(1.70 454.8(4.6) 80.2(0.9)
Guarantee Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
Equity Capital Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
Mixed 1297.8(20.4) 1655.1(21.0) 1863.4(20.5)  2074.4(20.8)    1655.1(19.1)
Unclassified 30.3(0.5) 51.4(0.7) 116.0(1.3) 139.4(1.4) 144.8(1.7)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage share of the total
Source: OECD (1996), p. 28
15
developing countries such as India are showing signs of replacing direct
support to R&D with that of indirect subsidies like tax concessions. I am
interested in two dimensions of this subsidy, namely the specific form it
has taken in various countries and second examining the empirical
evidence on its efficacy as a tool for stimulating investments in R&D by
private sector firms.
i.  Nature of Tax Incentives
The aim of a tax incentive is essentially to make investment in
R&D less costly to the firm and at the same time increase post-tax
profitability by offering tax relief on R&D expenditure. The joint effect
should be greater investment in R&D (Stoneman, 1993). Many countries
have used this instrument. In most countries the R&D tax credit allows
a firm to reduce its tax liability by an amount that is proportional to the
increase in its R&D expenditures(relative to a base period). Thus R&D
tax credit tends to increase the firm’s R&D because it reduces the price
of R&D11. According to Mansfield (1985) besides this benefit, tax credit
may also have an effect via the change in cash flow.  A recent survey of
the tax treatment of R&D expenditure in twenty developed and
developing countries12 (KPMG, 1994)  is presented in Table 5.
11  A formal proof for this is available in Mansfield(1985), pp. 403-7.
12 The twenty countries are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, and US.
16
The following inferences can be drawn from the study:
1. Majority of the countries covered in the sample allow almost
the entire revenue and capital expenditure expended on R&D to be
deducted from the taxable income during a year;
Table 5: Percentage Share of the Number of Countries Offering
Tax Deductions on R&D Expenditure
Nature of the deduction  Availability of tax Availability of tax deduction
deduction for revenue for capital expenditure
 base R & D on fixed assets linked to
expenditre R & D
* The entirety of the
expenditure 85% 90%
* art of the expenditure
* An amount greater 5% 0%
than the expenditure
If deduction is available,
is that deduction available 10% 10%
* in the first year 55% 10%
* in the period 1-3 years 0% 30%
* in the period 1-5 years 20% 40%
* in a period greater than
five years 0% 20%
* at the taxpayer’s
discretion 45% 0%
Source: KPMG (1994), pp. 1-2.
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2. In fact in some 10 per cent of the number of countries an amount
even greater than what is spent is allowed to be deducted13 ; and
3. Much of the revenue expenditure deductions are admissible in
the first year itself while much of the capital expenditure deductions are
admissible in the first five years.
An interesting finding of the survey is that it was in only 60 per
cent of the countries that the concepts of Research or Development is
defined for tax purposes. This means that it is possible for companies in
some of the countries14  in the sample to claim tax concessions for
activities which may not necessarily qualify as R&D like for instance
quality control and testing, market research etc.,. Finally in a majority of
the countries granting capital expenditure deductions, it is possible to
capitalise intangible intellectual property rights for the purposes of these
deductions.
The tax incentive schemes of the countries vary in its exact nature
or characteristics. Australia has got one of the most liberal schemes while
at the other extreme is Japan and the US. See Table 6.
13 The countries are Australia, Singapore and Belgium.
14 The countries are Belgium, China, France, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa,
Switzerland and the UK.
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ii. Effectiveness of Tax Incentives
The flagging or negative growth of business R&D expenditures in
most of the developed countries has once again brought to the fore the
efficacy of fiscal measures in general and tax-incentives in particular to
Table 6:  Characteristics of the Tax Incentive Schemes for R&D
Expenditure in Australia, Japan and the US
Characteristics Australia Japan USA
1.Year of 1985 1967 1981
Introduction
2.  Nature of tax- The companies The companies rece- Until July 1, 1995,
 deduction which spend A$ ive a tax-credit equal companies received
20,000 or more on to 20% of the incre- a tax-credit equal to
qualified R & D are ase in qualified R&D 20% of the increase
allowed to deduct over the highest in qualified R&D
150% of that amount previous year's R&D over a defined base
from their taxable expenditre, upto a amount (average of
income maximum of 10% of the 1984-88  period
the company's Thereare provisions
taxabilites. for carrying forward
credits not used
in the current fiscal
year
 3. Special Features R&D must involve There are special Start-up companies
appreciable novelty incentive for small  that do not yet have
or technical risk, and medium-sized tax-liabilities are
results should be businesses,  for offered a special
exploited in Austra- expenditures on tax-credit if they
lia, and there should special R& D activi- spend tax-credit if
be high Australian ties and the acquisi- they spend more
content tion of facilities for than 3% of their
basic research turnover on R&D
Source: Guinet and Kamata (1996), p. 24
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promote innovation. As seen earlier the main aim of tax incentives is to
prevent private sector enterprises from possible underinvestment in
industrial R&D by reducing the cost of doing it. Needless to add the
percentage reduction in R&D cost brought by a given nominal rate of
tax credit or concession will depend on the rate of corporation tax and
usually it will also vary from firm to firm. Guinet and Kamata (1996)
adduces several reasons for this. Firstly, many firms may not have
sufficient taxable income to offset against the tax-credit. A second source
of complication arises with incremental tax-credit mechanisms as the
real impact of tax credit on any firm’s total R&D costs will depend on
how the base for calculating the eligible increase in R&D expenditures
is defined and on sector-specific factors influencing the pace of R&D
growth. An empirical study15  of this issue based on the American
experience found that on an average the effective rate of tax credit was
about five times below its nominal rate of 20%; and the benefits from
the incremental tax-credit scheme varied considerably across industries
and firms.
From the point of view of policy makers the most important
question to be answered is how the firms respond to tax-induced change
in R&D cost. There are two methodologies for empirically testing this
proposition. The first technique  employ the simple survey method of
essentially questioning senior R&D managers about their response to
changes in the tax incentive system.  The second technique employs
econometric techniques to estimate the price elasticity of R&D- the
percentage increase in R&D induced by a percentage fall in its cost.
15 The details of the study by Hall,  B, “ R&D tax policy during the 1980s: Success
or Failure”, Tax Policy and the Economy, 1993, pp. 1-35 are quoted in Guinet
and Kamata (1996),  p. 23.
20
The most important study  employing the first technique is by E.
Mansfield  (1985). His study was based on a survey of firms in the US,
Sweden and Canada.  The main conclusion of the study was that “R&D
tax credits and allowances appear to have had only a modest effect on
R&D expenditures”. In each of the countries R&D tax incentives
increased R&D expenditures by not more than 1 or 2 percent. Second in
all these countries the increased R&D expenditures due to the tax
incentives seem to be substantially less than the revenue lost by the
government. This is best captured by the ratio of tax-incentive-induced
increase in R&D spending to the foregone government revenue and this
ratio raged from 0.3 to 0.4 in all the three countries. Mansfield thus
concluded that R&D tax incentives in their present form are unlikely to
have a major impact on the rate of innovation. However Mansfield’s
study is contested by Branscomb (1985) who argues that the question
should only be posed at a specific industry level. For instance he says
that R&D expenditures of some industries such as the IT industry
increased even during a phase when there were significant reductions in
the sales revenue of the industry due to the existence of the facility. He
also felt that to  dismiss the tax credits as inconsequential on the basis of
a study of the data for the first three years of its operation was premature
as the firms were just beginning to understand the usefulness of it. Second,
the limited impact of the tax credit could also be attributed to the low
corporate profits, taxable income and hence the ability to employ it  during
the period under question. So the survey technique which Mansfield
employed is now increasingly discarded.
There are now atleast three studies econometrically estimating the
price elasticity of R&D, once again based on the US experience. The
first one is by Bernstein and Nadiri ( 1989) who estimated a relatively
low price elasticity of 0.40 implying less than proportionate growth in
21
R&D expenditure as cost went down. But more recent studies16  estimated
the price elasticity to be around unity implying an almost proportionate
increase in R&D in response to a reduction in the cost of doing it.
There are  some well known problems of cheating by firms to
obtain tax credits. This cheating manifests itself by relabeling some
routine expenses as R&D expenditure. Mansfield’s survey found this on
a substantial scale in the case of Canadian firms. On the contrary an
official study by the Government Accounting Office of the US found
that relabeling though exists is only on a small scale. But this problem is
likely to be more acute in developing countries where the propensity to
cheat is rather high for understandable reasons.
Thus the evidence on the efficacy of tax-incentives is rather mixed.
The main weakness of this form of incentive is that it is very blunt
(Stoneman, 1993) as it is very difficult to direct it at specific projects or
industries. In fact as the US case has shown that only some firms and
industries may actually benefit from it. However it is still preferred to a
direct government subsidy especially in a phase of economic
liberalisation. This is due to a number of reasons: (1) They involve less
interference in the market and thus allow private sector decision-makers
to retain autonomy in devising their R&D strategies in response to market
signals; and (2) Tax-incentives are easier to administer and are less
discretionary compared to direct project subsidies often granted on a
case-by-case basis. Project grants are also less predictable as they are
subject to yearly budget allocations. (3) Given that there is a link between
R&D and productivity and if tax incentives raises R&D spending by
firms, it can lead to more efficient use of resources at the firm-level. But
nevertheless, as indicated in Table 4, the popularity of tax concessions
16 See Hines (1993) ; and  Baily and Lawrence (1987).
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as an instrument of public support to R&D is very much on the wane,
especially in developed countries.
The Indian Experience
The purpose of this section is to map out the main features of the
industrial R&D system in the country and the lessons that India can
draw from the experience of the developed countries interms of promoting
industrial research in the country. It is sometimes felt, especially in official
circles, that with the so called globalisation of technology and with the
country removing restrictions on firms from importing technology from
abroad it may not be that essential to strengthen the country’s research
system17 . This is an extremely fallacious argument. That there is no
empirical evidence for globalisation of technology, implying large scale
decentralisation of R&D activities by MNCs to developing countries,
has been established by a study by Patel and Pavitt (1995). Second, even
if firms want to unpack the technologies which they have imported from
abroad and develop local capabilities they ought to be investing in in-
house R&D activities.
Industrial R&D system in the country consists of the Government
Research Institutes or GRIs ( most of whom come under the purview of
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research [CSIR]) and in-house
R&D centres in productive enterprises in both the public and private
sectors. Some limited amount of research also goes on at the Universities
and at the Indian Institutes of Technology.  The planned form of industrial
development which the country subscribed to almost religiously from
the early 1950s up to the early 1990s has growth with technological
17 The scientists and engineers in the country has been lulled into a feeling of
complacency that “we shall not reinvent the wheel”. The ambivalent government
policies are to be blamed for this state of affairs rather than to the alleged
machinations of some external forces such as the MNCs.
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self-reliance as one of its main planks. This has undergone some changes
with the gradual liberalisation of the industrial sector since 1991. The
subscription to the dirigistic ideology meant that the government has
intervened in the R&D system rather heavily. This intervention manifests
itself in two explicit forms: (1) government itself financing and
performing R&D through  GRIs; and  (2) government encouraging
productive enterprise in the productive sector  to perform R&D by
granting them a host of fiscal concessions. A third but less explicit form
of government intervention is in the area of  providing the infrastructure
for industrial research. A main component of this infrastructure is the
provision of trained manpower(of scientists and engineers) from the
higher education system which is almost entirely government-owned.
Some Stylised Facts about Industrial R&D in India
First of all India devotes only about 0.8 percent of GDP on overall
R&D efforts while Japan spends about 2.9 percent and Korea about 1.9
percent. Secondly industrial research in India accounts for only 4 per
cent of what Japan spends and little over a third of what Korea expends.
In fact until recently India used to spend  even three times the Korean
expenditure in the period up to the early 1980s. See Table 7.
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Table 7: Industrial Research in India, Korea and Japan, 1975-1990
(R&D expenditure is in constant 1987 PPP$ and growth
rates are in percent)
  Year Japan G Gate S. Kores G. Rate India G. Gate Ratio of Ratio of
India to India to
Japan Japan
1975 11263 NA NA 327 NA 0.03 NA
1976 11738 4.22 94 NA 365 11.62 0.03 3.88
1977 12358 5.28 222 136.17 413 13.15 0.03 1.86
1978 12890 4.30 234 5.41 551 33.41 0.04 2.35
1979 14553 12.90 215 -8.12 597 8.35 0.04 2.78
1980 16525 13.55 238 10.70 670 12.23 0.04 2.82
1981 18505 11.98 302 26.89 747 11.49 0.04 2.47
1982 20208 9.20 482 59.60 872 16.73 0.04 1.81
1983 22651 12.09 839 74.07 930 6.65 0.04 1.11
1984 25203 11.27 1156 37.78 947 1.83 0.04 0.82
1985 28708 13.91 1550 34.08 983 3.80 0.03 0.63
1986 29084 1.31 2051 32.32 1079 9.77 0.04 0.53
1987 30984 6.53 2372 15.65 1128 4.54 0.04 0.48
1988 34241 10.51 2988 25.97 1304 15.60 0.04 0.44
1989 38448 12.29 3491 16.83 1444 10.74 0.04 0.41
1990 42213 9.79 3733 6.93 1392 -3.60 0.03 0.37
Average 9.28 33.88 10.42 0.04 1.52
Source: National Science Foundation (1993), pp. 112-113
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Thirdly,  Industrial R&D accounts for only less than  a quarter of
the overall national R&D in India while a lion’ share of the national
R&D in other Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea is devoted
to Industrial R&D. In fact Korea is one country which has systematically
raised its share of Industrial R&D. See Figure 3.   As far as the Indian
data are concerned there can be some underestimation as a part of the
R&D expenditure incurred by the Departments of Space, Defence
Production and Atomic Energy has important civilian spillovers though
there aren’t any systematic estimation of the extent of such spillovers to
the industry.  This is thus an area for further research.
Fourthly, contrary to the normal belief the extent of government
intervention18  in performing R&D in the industrial sector is only about
59 per cent. See Table 8.
18 This is measured as the share of the Government (GRIs + Public Sector Enterprises)
R&D spending expressed as a percentage share of overall industrial R&D.
Figure 3
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Needless to add my measure of the extent of government
intervention captures only the direct intervention by the state . If one
adds the indirect intervention measures the actual intervention is likely
to be higher. But the main problem is the quantification of these measures.
Fifthly, as a corollary of the above much of the industrial R&D in
the country is actually done by in-house R&D centres in both the public
and private sector industry. This is best indicated by the ratio of R&D
spending by the GRIs to that of the production enterprises. See Figure 4.
Table 8: Extent of Government Intervention in Industrial R&D in
India (Rs in Crores at Current Prices)
Year Production Enterprises GRI's Govern- Extent of
ment    Government
Public Private Intervention(%)
1978-79 551.90 58.80 440.35 992.25 56.67
1979-80 734.10 921.50 591.90 1326.00 59.00
1980-81 853.65 1206.91 690.0 1543.65 56.12
1981-82 1075.53 1470.00   787.70 1863.23 55.90
1982-83 1224.63  1669.54 1140.84 2365.47 58.62
1983-84 1616.55  1763.24 1241.86 2858.41 61.85
1984-85 2357.55 2010.67 1464.83 3822.38 65.53
1986-87 2357.00  2698.00 1723.35 4080.35 60.20
1987-88 2884.70   2870.40 1851.29 4735.99 62.26
1988-89 3421.20 4068.60 2093.28 5514.48 57.54
1989-90 4129.00 4779.50 2395.21 6524.21 57.72
1990-91 4145.30  4564.80 2491.89 6637.19 59.25
1991-92 4843.90 5248.60 2745.50 7589.40 59.12
1992-93 5867.10 6498.90 2962.90 8830.00 57.60
Average Rate
of growth(%) 20.54  17.19 16.27 18.64
Notes: 1. GRIs = Government Research Institutes which are essentially
the CSIR Laboratories;
2. State here means GRIs + Public Sector Enterprises;
Source: Government of India (Various Issues).
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Sixthly, even in production enterprises investments in R&D
accounts for only a small fraction of the investments in new plant and
machinery. This shows that Indian firms pay very little attention to the
domestic development of disembodied technology. Rather they prefer
the easier route of technology imports from abroad.  See Figure 5.
Seventhly, the ratio of R&D investments to advertising has
significantly come down since the mid 1980s. See Figure 6.  This means
that firms have tended to give relatively more importance to product
differentiation than to making real technological improvements.
Eighthly, very little of the output of the research results of GRIs
are actually commercialised in the industry (Mani, 1996). This is indicated
by the low earnings ratio of the CSIR labs. The ratio is defined as the
share of the income generated by sale of technology to the industry , by
way of royalty, sales premia etc., in the total budget of these labs. See
Figure 7.
Figure 4
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Figure 5
Figure 6
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Finally, in terms of the output of R&D, measured by the number
of patents published by Indians in India, it is the private sector industry
which accounts  for a larger share of about 37 percent of all patents
published in India. The share of the state sector consisting of the GRIs19
and public sector enterprises is only about 24 percent and much of it is
contributed by the GRIs. This means that industrial research accounted
for nearly two thirds of the total number of patents published by Indians
in the country. See Table 9.
Figure 7
19 It should however be added that when the GRIs were established they were not
expected to or encouraged to file patents. But this scenario has changed. Infact
the strategic plan prepared for the CSIR up to the year 2001 states explicitly, that
the system should (a) hold a  patent bank of 5000 foreign patents (up from 50).
(b) realise 10% pf operational expenditure from intellectual property licensing
etc., See CSIR (1996), p. 4.
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Table 9: Distribution of Industrial  Patents Published in India by
the State  and Private Sector Industry , 1974-75 through
1991-92 (Number)
Fiscal Industrial Industrial Total All Patents Share of Share of
year patents patents Indus- Govt.(%) private sector
End- publi- published trial in indus- (%) in indus-
ing shed by by private patents tiral trial patents
Govt. sector patents
1975 135 139 274 477 49.27 50.73
1976 119 142 261 446 45.59 54.41
1977 110 202 312 705 35.26 64.74
1978 215 200 415 757 51.81 48.19
1979 152 172 324 553 46.91 53.09
1980 71 183 254 477 27.95 72.05
1981 83 115 198 327 41.92 58.08
1982 77 141 218 408 35.32 64.68
1983 110 191 301 452 36.54 63.46
1984 61 136 197 335 30.96 69.04
1985 216 245 461 709 46.85 53.15
1986 63 178 241 445 26.14 73.86
1987 102 203 305 488 33.44 66.56
1988 194 284 478 692 40.59 59.41
1989 103 344 447 543 23.04 76.96
1990 100 93 193 337 51.81 48.19
1991 136 156 292 472 46.58 53.42
1992 921 38 230 365 40.00 60.00
Source: National Science and Technology Management Information
System. (1994), p. 42
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In sum, industrial research though accounting for only about a
quarter of the total national R&D expenditure does account for very
nearly two-thirds of the output of R&D in terms of the number of patents
published. Within the Indian industrial R&D system, the state sector
accounts for nearly 59 percent of the total expenditure but its share in
the output of R&D is lower (39 per cent) than that of the private sector
industry. It is against this background that I discuss the incentives given
for promoting industrial research in India. Analytically speaking one
could divide the incentives into two: fiscal and non-fiscal. Fiscal
incentives include tax credits, project grants etc., while non-fiscal
incentives consists essentially of the supply of human resource for
industrial research. I discuss each of them seriatim.
Fiscal Incentives for Industrial Research in India
The history of the fiscal incentives for industrial research in India
can be traced to 1973. From that year onwards, the practise of recognising
in-house R&D centres(by the Ministry of Science and Technology) was
initiated. The recognised R&D centres are entitled to a host of fiscal
incentives. This is summarised in Table 10.
Table 10 :A  Summary of Fiscal Incentives for Recognised  Industrial
Research in India
  Nature of Fiscal Incentives         Scope
1. Tax incentives-
*   Direct tax exemptions * Under Sections 35(1 and 2) of the Income Tax Act,
both revenue and capital expenditure on scientific
research incurred by the in-house R&D unit on
activities related to the business of the company is
allowed to be fully  (100%) deducted from the
32
taxable income for that year. As per the Union
Budget for 1997-98, the deduction for capital
expenditure has been raised to 125% for a specified
set of industries such as drugs and
pharmaceuticals, electronic equipment, telecom
equipment etc.,
* Indirect tax exemptions * Under Section 80-1A of the Income Tax Act a five
year tax holiday has been allowed to companies
created exclusively for participation in R&D
activities.
* All recognised scientific and industrial research
organisations are eligible for exemption on
customs duty on the import of scientific equipment,
instruments, spares, accessories as well as
consumables for research and development
activities and programmes;
* Full exemption from customs duty on plans,
designs and drawings;
* Goods developed and patented in India and
concurrently in specified countries have been
exempted from levy of excise duty for a period of
three  years.
2. Weighted tax deduction for * A weighted tax deduction of 125% of the financial
 sponsored research contribution made by industry on R&D projects
and programmes sponsored by industry in
approved national labs, Universities, Indian
Institutes of Technologies etc.
3. Investment allowance on  * This allowance at an enhanced rate is under section
plant and machinery set up 32 A (2B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The
based on indigenous Secretary, Department of Scientific and industrial
technology Research is the prescribed authority for certifying
the investments made on plant and machinery
based on technology. This incentive is more to
generate commercialisable technologies rather than
to do mere R&D which may not result in any
saleable technologies.
4. Depreciation allowance on * This is a system whereby accelerated depreciation
plant and machinery established in respect of blocks of assets. The rate structure is
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on the basis of indigenous rationalised by reducing the number of rates as also
technology. by providing for depreciation at higher rates.
5. Incentives for GRIs:
Matching grant for moder- * The Union Budget for 1996-97 initiated this
nisation of GRIs scheme and in the budget for 1997-98 this is
made permanent.
GRIs are allowed to invest in * The GRIs are allowed to capitalise their know-
the equity of private sector how sales to private sector firms thereby getting
enterprises a better return to their investments.
Source: DSIR (1989), pp. 98-102.,  DSIR (1995-96), pp. 55-58.
              Government of India (1995-96)
Thus direct tax incentives are the most dominant type. But there
have been no studies so far on its effectiveness.  A simple but
unsophisticated way of measuring its effectiveness is to trace the trends
in the real rate of growth of in-house R&D expenditures in production
enterprises. A major limitation is the non-availability of data during the
pre-introduction period(i.e., pre 1973). Data are available only since 1977-
78-five years after the introduction of the incentive scheme. A second
limitation is the very sharp increase in the rate of growth in 1980-81. In
order to overcome its effects I have plotted the real rate of growth
including that year(GR-1) and excluding the year (GR-2). See Figure 7.
If one goes by GR-2, it is seen that the real R&D expenditure has only
shown rather violent fluctuations20  implying thereby that the incentives
have not been successful in continually raising the real rate of growth
(though, as indicated in Table 8, in nominal terms the expenditure has
shown continuous increases). See Figure 8.
20 The violent fluctuations in R&D expenditure may also be caused by problems in
reporting. In order to take care of this problem I have plotted the rate of growth of
average R&D expenditure per production enterprise. This series also showed
violent fluctuations.
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Figure 8
Finally as indicated above, in order to reap the incentives the
production enterprises, in both the public and private sectors, have
resorted to relabeling. This is because there are no mechanisms or
arrangements either within the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research (DSIR) or within the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT)
to audit the R&D expenditures21  purported to have been incurred by an
enterprise during a year. This increases the propensity to relabel22 . In
21 A recent amendment to the Companies Act requires firms with recognised in-
house R&D Centres to disclose not only the expenditure on R&D but also the
output interms of new products and processes developed in the firm’s annual
report for the year. To mention this in the report, the items will have to be audited
by the duly appointed charted accountants.
22 In fact the tax incentives to in-house R&D centres were as high as 133.33 per
cent during the 1980s. It is the realisation of this growing tendency to relabeling
that has reduced it to a 100 percent setoff.
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the light of these comments a comprehensive study on the efficacy of
direct tax incentives to stimulate in-house R&D by the production
enterprises is warranted.
The Table (table 10)  does not discuss any direct grant given for
conducting industrial R&D. In the early 1980s the central government
promoted mission oriented R&D approach in two high technology areas,
namely in telecom and in advanced computing. This was institutionalised
by establishing two research organisations, the Centre for Development
of Telematics (C-Dot) focusing on the former area and the Centre for
Development of Advanced Computing (C-Dac) in the latter area. Both
of them had innovative organisational structures   liberal funding and
had to develop and commercialise certain well defined key technologies
within a definite time frame . The C-Dot which was charged with the
responsibility of developing a family of digital electronic switching
systems was initially very successful. But extreme political interference
in its functioning has virtually sounded its death knell23 .  The C-Dac has
been equally successful in developing parallel processing technology in
advanced computing. But todate there have been no independent
evaluation of its functioning. A common element in both the organisations
is that though they are exclusive R&D organisations set up outside the
production system, the mission oriented approach ensured that they have
a high degree of interaction with the production enterprises. Despite the
availability of sufficient evidence on the utility of these types of R&D
organisations, the government has not extended this to other areas of
high technology.
23 A detailed evaluation of the C-Dot experiment is available in Mani (1992), pp.
107-113.
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Finally it was as late as in  1996-9724  that the government
introduced a scheme by which direct grant was made available to
production enterprises to carry out research leading to commercialisation.
Firms could get funding for specified projects after a competitive process.
Known as the Technology Development and Application Fund, it is
administered by the Technology Development Board functioning within
the  Department of Science and Technology. The origin of this fund
could be traced to the R&D Cess Act of 1986 prescribing a levy of 5 per
cent tax on all payments for import of disembodied technologies by
production enterprises. The fund thus accumulated is to be used for
establishing a venture capital scheme with one of the leading state-owned
development banks in the country with the ultimate aim of providing
risk capital to commercialise domestically developed technologies. It is
seen (Mani, 1996) that the shame had not been successful in fulfilling
these objectives and the growing realisation of this has led to its recasting.
In its first year of operation the fund was allotted Rs 300 million
and it has granted assistance to 16 projects in health, chemicals and
pharmaceutical industries.  In the second year (i.e., 1997-98) a sum of
Rs 700 million is allocated. The main weakness of the fund is in the
nature of its funding: it depends crucially on two sources, namely the
proceeds from the R&D Cess and  budgetary allocations. With increased
liberalisation of technology imports through the automatic route there
may also not be reliable estimates of the R&D Cess. So it remains to be
seen whether the government will have even accurate data on the quantum
of R&D Cess to be collected in a year.
24 The Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC) has
been for some time providing direct assistance to production enterprises for
upscaling and commercialisation of indigenous technologies under its Home
Grown Technology(HGT) programme. From  current press reports not more than
five projects have been supported under the programme. However from initial
reports the programme is considered to be a success.
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Thus as against the developed country pattern the role of direct
grants for industrial research is only secondary.
Human Resource for Industrial Research
The country has an extensive university system which has increased
in enrolments by a factor of 20 since 1947. Almost all the universities
are owned and governed by the state. Traditionally speaking science and
engineering has been given much importance essentially supported by
massive governmental subsidies. This has ensured a steady supply of
scientists and engineers. Despite this, the density of scientists and
engineers engaged in R&D is one of the lowest compared even to other
Asian countries. See Table 11.
Table 11: Density of Scientists and Engineers in R&D in India, South
Korea, Japan, the US and the UK
(Scientists and engineers in Research and Development per 10, 000 of
the labour force)
Year India S.Korea Japan USA UK
1975 NA 7. 89 45.55 55.30 30.6
1980 2.45 12.49 53.10 60.00 35.8
1985 2.78 24.66 63.74 71.83 45.0
1990 3.34 37.22 74.21 74.50 45.6
Source: National Science Foundation (1993), p. 123
38
This shows that there is considerable scope for increasing the
employment, given the vast reservoir of technically trained personnel
available in the country.
A second point is about the oft repeated complaint of the industry
of serious mismatches between the type of human resource available
and the type of human resource required for carrying out especially
applied research in frontier areas25 . This is because the Indian higher
education system has traditionally emphasised degrees in natural sciences
to engineering. See Table 12. This emphasis on fields of natural science
has resulted in the country’s scientific strengths in high energy physics,
plant biochemistry, solid state and inorganic chemistry, microelectronic
materials, polymers and ceramics (NSF, 1987).  In engineering there is
significant variation in the quality of students. Those passing out from
the Indian Institutes of Technology( IITs) are considered to be world
class. But a large number of them go abroad immediately26 . In fact
according to a study by the National Science Board27  about 76 per cent
of the Indian doctoral recipients (in science and engineering streams)
from US universities have plans to stay back in the US while about 58
percent of them have firm plans to remain in that country. This indicates
the extent of brain drain from India and the process can seriously hamper
supply of the right kind of personnel for industrial research. But no efforts
have been made by the state to reverse this trend as the both the state and
the domestic industry is very often unable to provide the right kind of
environment for these highly discerning graduates.
25 The governments of both Taiwan and South Korea have expanded their investments
in R&D to support research and training of scientists and engineers for their high
technology industries like electronics.
26 According to one estimate (Maddox, 1984) the proportion of  IIT graduates going
abroad is as high as 80 per cent among computer science graduates.
27 The data refers to 1991. The corresponding figure for S Koreans are 37 and 23
percent. See National Science Board (1993), pp. 288-291.
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Summing up
In this paper I have mapped out the extent of government
intervention and the nature of incentives given to civilian industrial R&D
in a host of developed countries and in India. It is seen that, contrary to
normal impression, the extent of government intervention in industrial
R&D in India is not very high. The state has been using tax incentives as
the major instrument for stimulating R&D by production enterprises.
But in the developed countries direct grants are becoming the dominant
instrument as it can be targeted towards specific projects. There are
Table 12:  Ratio of Advanced Degree (Master’s and Doctoral) Holders
in Natural Science to those in Engineering in India, Japan,
and S Korea
Year India Japan S Korea
1975 13.80 0.24 NA
1976 12.18 0.27 0.69
1977 10.75 0.25 0.69
1978 9.48 0.22 0.61
1979 9.44 0.23 0.55
1980 9.74 0.25 0.49
1981 10.05 0.26 0.43
1982 10.37 0.25 0.39
1983 10.70 0.25 0.55
1984 11.04 0.23 0.54
1985 11.33 0.24 0.73
1986 8.55 0.22 0.58
1987 8.35 0.22 0.61
1988 8.86 0.22 0.33
1989 8.56 0.22 0.31
1990 8.69 0.22 0.34
Source: National Science Foundation (1993), pp. 84-85.
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essentially two lessons which India can learn from the experiences of
developed countries. Firstly, the interventions by the state in the
technology market has to be very selective essentially to foster and
develop technologies which are very strategic in nature. Secondly,  their
experience also supports the belief that national technology policy
designed to give domestic firms a competitive edge has not become
obsolete in a so called globalised world. On the contrary, economic policy
debates in the west have devoted increasing attention to the design and
implementation of policies to aid the growth of high-technology
industries.
In fact the efficacy of tax incentives to encourage R&D requires
further scrutiny. The state in India also have to intervene for making
available technically trained manpower to engage in industrial R&D
radically redesigning the higher education system, by improving the
incentive system for those working in the R&D system etc. Thus there is
enough space for the Indian state to increase its interventionist role in
industrial research contrary to the arguments for its gradual withdrawal.
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